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Abstract: Behavioral public policies are aimed at influencing the behavior of
the public in a way that is advantageous for the public itself and within the
law. Sanders, Snijders and Hallsworth (2018, this issue) summarize the state
of the art of this new field of study and introduce a number of challenges
and opportunities for the time to come. We address an additional challenge
that is present and central in all attempts to influence behavior, namely the
public – the people that are the target of behavioral public policies. We
review evidence revealing that people do not passively accept those influence
attempts, but often show reactant responses. We propose that the Persuasion
Knowledge Model provides a framework both to understand the reactions of
the public and to facilitate communication between academic researchers and
practitioners.
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Public policy may be conceptualized as the actions by which a government
addresses the needs of its citizens. This includes the implementation of rules
and regulations to ensure that the public does not engage in undesirable beha-
viors. Recent developments, primarily based on findings from the field of
behavioral economics, take into account the fact that behavioral interventions
might sometimes be more efficient than such traditional policy tools in achiev-
ing policy-makers’ goals (Benartzi et al., 2017), hence the popularity of
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behavioral public policy. The goal of behavioral public policy is influencing the
behavior of the public in a way that is within the law and advantageous for the
public itself. Sanders, Snijders and Hallsworth (2018) nicely summarize the
state of the art of this new field of study and introduce a number of challenges
and opportunities for the time to come. We would like to address another chal-
lenge that is present in all attempts to influence behavior; namely, the public
that is the target of these interventions. Taking into account the public – the
people that are going to be influenced by these policies – is crucial, as is
evident from the fact that some interventions have proven to be less effective
than expected beforehand. We will illustrate this later on using the recent pro-
posed change of default in the organ donor laws in The Netherlands (Krijnen
et al., 2018).
Our point is actually quite simple and straightforward. When one attempts
to influence people’s behavior, one should take into account that the people
one is targeting have an opinion about this. In the fields of social psychology
and marketing, theories have been developed to understand the reactions of
people that are subjected to such influence attempts. We would like to briefly
review these theories here, as we believe that people’s reactions to influence
attempts is an overlooked issue in behavioral public policy. In particular,
attempts to influence behavior can trigger so-called ‘reactance’ in the person
targeted. Reactance is the counter-response that can occur when people feel
their freedom to behave, choose or think in a particular way is being threatened
(Brehm, 1966). But as of now, very little is known about when and how behav-
ioral public policy interventions trigger reactance. As the popularity of these
interventions increases and their use spreads through governments, regulators
and other agencies worldwide, improving our understanding of public
responses is both important and timely.
Here, we make the case for putting the public back in behavioral public
policy. We first look at reactance and what is known about reactance in rela-
tion to behavioral public policy interventions. We then propose that a well-
known theory from marketing research – the Persuasion Knowledge Model
– has great potential for improving our understanding of public responses to
behavioral policy interventions. We conclude by articulating several research
questions that, in our opinion, should be high on the field’s list of research
priorities.
Reactance theory
Reactance is the well-known social psychological theory about how people
react to threats of loss of freedom (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981).
When people expect freedom and they perceive that this freedom is being
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restricted, reactance can occur. In this context, threats to freedom should be
interpreted broadly. They include flat-out restrictions and prohibitions, but
also the pressure to behave, choose or think in a particular way. Think, for
example, of a government trying to implement new consumer protection regu-
lations (Clee &Wicklund, 1980), an insurance provider limiting the number of
product options available to a particular consumer or a parent pressuring his or
her child to eat more vegetables. In the literature, reactance is treated both as a
motivational state (Clee & Wicklund, 1980), to be measured by looking at the
outcome of a choice process or a combination of anger and negative cognitions
(Rains, 2013), and as a trait (Jung & Mellers, 2016) that can be measured
directly.
As parents who have attempted to increase the vegetable intake of their off-
spring will be able to confirm, pressure to behave in a particular way does not
necessarily increase enthusiasm about the desired behavior in the person being
pressured. In fact, threats to freedom can lead a person to do the opposite of
what was intended – the so-called boomerang effect (Clee & Wicklund,
1980). The behavior shown by a person experiencing reactance is not primarily
intended to be in line with this person’s own preferences, but it is intended to
regain a sense of control (Jachimowicz et al., 2017). This can even lead to
people choosing options that are objectively worse than available alternatives
(Jung & Mellers, 2016).
Reactance and behavioral public policy
Several studies have looked at support for behavioral public policy interven-
tions, particularly various types of nudges, in the USA and a number of
European countries (Jung & Mellers, 2016; Reisch & Sunstein, 2016). These
studies find that support for many nudges is fairly high, often higher than
support for more traditional policy tools like taxes and prohibitions. Reisch
and Sunstein (2016) found substantial differences between countries in terms
of average levels of support. The same authors found no clear link between
support for nudges and demographic variables and political orientation
(with the exception of the USA). Jung and Mellers (2016) found that attitudes
toward nudging are partly driven by individual dispositions. They found that
empathetic people generally support nudges, while individualists and conserva-
tives generally oppose them. Reactant people also expressed less support for
nudges because they perceived them as autonomy threatening.
Crucially, due to their research design, Jung and Mellers (2016) were unable
to disentangle attitudes toward nudging from attitudes toward underlying
policy goals. Using a research design developed to do just this, Tannenbaum
et al. (2017, p. 1) found a large partisan nudge bias in a series of experiments:
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they described this as “an instance of attribution substitution, where indivi-
duals evaluate the acceptability of a policy nudge by instead assessing how
they feel about the associated policy objective or policy sponsor.”
Reisch and Sunstein (2016) also concluded that people seem to have stronger
opinions about the underlying policy goals than about the policy instruments.
One puzzling example of this is their finding of significant support for sublim-
inal advertising to discourage smoking and overeating – a nudge judged to be
extremely inappropriate by the authors themselves – in many European
countries.
While Tannenbaum et al.’s (2017) partisan nudge bias disappears when par-
tisan cues are removed from the nudge description, the authors emphasized
that removing all political context in real-world cases is simply impossible.
Moreover, both experiences in the field and in the lab have shown that attempts
to nudge can in fact lead to reactance. Let us provide some examples.
In late 2016, one of the chambers of the Dutch parliament passed a bill to
change the system for organ donation in The Netherlands from opt in (you
are not a donor until you register yourself as one) to opt out (presumed
consent unless you explicitly indicate you do not want to be a donor). Even
though the bill still needs to be approved by the other chamber before it
becomes law, Krijnen et al. (2018, emphasis added) described how the bill
and corresponding media attention led to reactance, even among people that
had previously consented by explicitly opting in on a governmental website.
Remarkably, however, the month the bill passed the number of residents who
explicitly registered as non-donors spiked to roughly 40 times the number
found in previous months. This dramatic (albeit temporary) jump in active
rejections was observed not only among newly registering residents, but
also among those who had previously consented to donation and then
went to the trouble of revoking their consent.
Reiter et al. (2012) examined consent for human papillomavirus (HPV) vac-
cines in the lab. The HPV vaccine for adolescents is controversial for many
parents, and uptake of the vaccine has remained far below the levels recom-
mended by health experts. Contrary to their own hypothesis, the researchers
found that parents were more likely to agree to vaccination in the opt-in scen-
ario than in the opt-out or neutral scenarios. Also in the lab, Hedlin and
Sunstein (2016) found reactance to a green energy default when this option
was more costly than ‘regular’ energy. And Arad and Rubinstein (2017)
found that even when people support the underlying policy goals (e.g.,
saving more and eating more healthy foods), a significant proportion objected
to the nudges used to achieve those policy goals. Concern about manipulation
(in other words, reactance) seems to be an important driver of objection.
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That government regulations, even those with the best interests of the public
at heart, could cause reactance was foreseen by reactance theorists (Clee &
Wicklund, 1980). Of course, one of the reasons nudges are so popular is
that they are alternatives to more traditional policy tools like conventional
regulation (e.g., rules on information disclosure) and they preserve nominal
(although not necessarily effective) freedom of choice (Rebonato, 2014). In
fact, Sunstein (2017) argued that reactance is rare and probably not a big
issue in the case of nudges (in this particular case: defaults) because defaults
preserve autonomy. But, as also argued by others (Clee & Wicklund, 1980;
Pavey & Sparks, 2009; Jachimowicz et al., 2017), it is perceived autonomy
that matters.
In other words, for reactance to occur, it is not necessary that freedom is
actually limited. What is necessary, however, is that people experience some
pressure to change (Clee & Wicklund, 1980). Thus, for reactance to occur in
the case of behavioral public policy interventions, people need only have the
impression that someone is trying to influence their behavior. At present, the
number of studies looking at the effect of transparency on nudging is still
limited, particularly in field settings and for topics with relevance for public
policy-makers. Moreover, the results so far have been inconclusive, probably
as a result of various types of transparency being tested. Loewenstein et al.
(2014), for example, found that transparency about the presence of defaults
did not impact decision-making. Steffel et al. (2016) found that disclosing
the intent of a nudge had no effect on the effectiveness of a default. Studies
on the effect of disclosing the unconscious character of nudges on support
show conflicting results (e.g., Felsen et al., 2013; Petrescu et al., 2016). And,
as described previously, when Tannenbaum et al. (2017) disclosed the
policy-maker doing the nudging, this had a large effect on nudge acceptance.
Putting the public back in behavioral public policy
Together, these observations demonstrate that it is important to keep in mind
that behavioral public policy not only contains the word ‘behavioral’, but also
the word ‘public’. Put differently, when designing interventions, we should not
forget the psychology of the people being influenced (for related arguments, see
Jachimowicz et al., 2017; Krijnen et al., 2018).
Our observations in the previous sections also demonstrate that our under-
standing of the psychological reactions to behavioral public policy interven-
tions is still limited, fragmented and lacking a coherent theoretical
framework. This makes it very hard for policy-makers to distill practically rele-
vant lessons. Additionally, it contributes to the gap between policy-makers and
academia as identified by Sanders, Snijders and Hallsworth (2018).
222 P A T R I C I A D E J O N G E E T A L .
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2018.23
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit van Tilburg / Tilburg University, on 22 May 2019 at 14:40:19, subject to the
It may not be remarkable that in marketing and communication science, the
importance of the psychology of the people being influenced has received ample
attention. This has resulted in theoretical approaches that could help improve
our understanding of when and why behavioral public policy interventions
trigger reactance. In particular, the Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM;
Friestad & Wright, 1994) offers a lot of potential, both for increasing our
understanding of public reactions to influence attempts and for unifying
insights that stem from various hitherto unrelated research programs.
The potential of the Persuasion Knowledge Model
The PKM states that how a person responds to a persuasion attempt is not only
influenced by that person’s knowledge about the topic at hand and the persua-
sion agent, but also by what Friestad and Wright (1994) refer to as that
person’s persuasion knowledge. Persuasion knowledge includes a person’s
beliefs about strategies and tactics used by a persuasion agent, the effectiveness
and appropriateness of these tactics and the available response strategies.
Topic, agent and persuasion knowledge interact to influence how someone
copes with a persuasion attempt – although this interaction is in fact rarely
studied (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008).
The PKM is by no means a novel theory. Peter Wright coined the idea as far
back as 1986 in his presidential address at the Association for Consumer
Research conference (1986, p. 1):
Isn’t it very plausible that people have intuitive theories about the tactics that
are used in the game of marketplace selling-and-buying? They surely must
have personal insights that are pertinent for realizing, “Aha! Somebody’s
scheming to sell me something! Somebody’s trying to mind-screw me!”,
and for interpreting and evaluating and dealing with whatever influence
tactics are being used. I’ll call such an intuitive theory about marketers’
influence tactics a “schemer schema.”
In the same speech,Wright advocated shifting the research focus from persuasion
agent to persuasion target; that is, the consumer. It does not require a great deal of
imagination to see the relevance of Wright’s intuitions, and their subsequent the-
oretical elaboration in the PKM, to the study of behavioral public policy and
public reactions to interventions. Yet to the best of our knowledge, only one
paper on nudges, by Steffel et al. (2016), explicitly refers to persuasion theory.
Steffel et al. (2016) use persuasion theory mainly to make the case for more
transparency about the use of defaults. We think the usefulness of the PKM in
the context of behavioral public policy is actually much greater. For example,
applying the PKM to the work by Tannenbaum and colleagues (2017) clarifies
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that, when asked for their attitude toward an instrument of persuasion, people
primarily apply their topic knowledge (or rather, beliefs) and agent knowledge
(beliefs) in forming a judgment, rather than their knowledge of the persuasion
strategies and tactics involved. To the extent that people do apply their persua-
sion knowledge – for example, when perceived effectiveness is an important
driver of attitude to nudges (cf. Petrescu et al., 2016) – persuasion knowledge
about behavioral public policy interventions seems limited and is often wrong.
For example, many people seem to think that educational campaigns are more
effective than changing defaults (Diepeveen et al., 2013; Jung &Mellers, 2016).
These findings raise a number of interesting empirical questions for the study
of reactions to behavioral public policy interventions that, as of now, remain
unanswered. For example, is it possible to trigger accurate persuasion knowl-
edge about behavioral public policy interventions? And if so, what is the most
effective way of doing so? How does activated persuasion knowledge impact
attitudes toward nudges and other interventions, and how does it impact
their effectiveness?
Conclusion
We have argued that, as the application of behavioral public policy is gaining
popularity, it is both important and timely to improve our understanding of
public responses to behavioral interventions. We know that policy interven-
tions, including behavioral ones like nudges, can trigger reactance, but we
know very little about how, why and when this happens. To further our under-
standing of reactance and to unify existing insights into a coherent theoretical
model, we propose the use of the PKM. Using the PKM allows us to move
beyond studying nudges in isolation and to include the policy context. Using
the PKM will also allow researchers to connect currently unconnected
strands of scholarship frommarketing, communication psychology and behav-
ioral economics – thereby contributing to a field that has the potential to be
truly interdisciplinary. A more coherent theoretical framework will also
make it easier for policy-makers to distill practical lessons. In this way, we
hope to contribute to closing the gap identified by Sanders, Snijders and
Hallsworth (2018) between academic research on the one hand and practi-
tioners’ need for more and more systematic knowledge about effective and
acceptable behavioral public policy interventions on the other.
Disclosure
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
official positions of the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM).
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